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Abstract
The P4 programming language offers high-level, declarative abstractions that bring the flexibility of
software to the domain of networking. Unfortunately, the main abstraction used to represent packet
data in P4, namely header types, lacks basic safety guarantees. Over the last few years, experience
with an increasing number of programs has shown the risks of the unsafe approach, which often
leads to subtle software bugs.
This paper proposes SafeP4, a domain-specific language for programmable data planes in
which all packet data is guaranteed to have a well-defined meaning and satisfy essential safety
guarantees. We equip SafeP4 with a formal semantics and a static type system that statically
guarantees header validity—a common source of safety bugs according to our analysis of real-world
P4 programs. Statically ensuring header validity is challenging because the set of valid headers can
be modified at runtime, making it a dynamic program property. Our type system achieves static
safety by using a form of path-sensitive reasoning that tracks dynamic information from conditional
statements, routing tables, and the control plane. Our evaluation shows that SafeP4’s type system
can effectively eliminate common failures in many real-world programs.
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1 Introduction
I couldn’t resist the temptation to put in a null reference [...] This has led to
innumerable errors, vulnerabilities, and system crashes, which have probably
caused a billion dollars of pain and damage in the last forty years.
—Tony Hoare
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2:2 Type-Safe Data Plane Programming with SafeP4
Modern languages offer features such as type systems, structured control flow, objects,
modules, etc. that make it possible to express rich computations in terms of high-level
abstractions rather than machine-level code. Increasingly, many languages also offer funda-
mental safety guarantees—e.g., well-typed programs do not go wrong [23]—that make entire
categories of programming errors simply impossible.
Unfortunately, although computer networks are critical infrastructure, providing the
communication fabric that underpins nearly all modern systems, most networks are still
programmed using low-level languages that lack basic safety guarantees. Unsurprisingly,
networks are unreliable and remarkably insecure—e.g., the first step in a cyberattack often
involves compromising a router or other network device [26, 19].
Over the past decade, there has been a shift to more flexible platforms in which the
functionality of the network is specified in software. Early efforts related to software-defined
networking (SDN) [21, 6], focused on the control plane software that computes routes,
balances load, and enforces security policies, and modeled the data plane as a simple pipeline
operating on a fixed set of packet formats. However, there has been recent interest in allowing
the functionality of the data plane itself to be specified as a program—e.g., to implement
new protocols, make more efficient use of hardware resources, or even relocate application-
level functionality into the network [15, 14]. In particular, the P4 language [4] enables the
functionality of a data plane to be programmed in terms of declarative abstractions such
as header types, packet parsers, match-action tables, and structured control flow that a
compiler maps down to an underlying target device.
Unfortunately, while a number of P4’s features were clearly inspired by designs found in
modern languages, the central abstraction for representing packet data—header types—lacks
basic safety guarantees. To a first approximation, a P4 header type can be thought of as a
record with a field for each component of the header. For example, the header type for an
IPv4 packet, would have a 4-bit version field, an 8-bit time-to-live field, two 32-bit fields for
the source and destination addresses, and so on.
According to the P4 language specification, an instance of a header type may either be
valid or invalid: if the instance is valid, then all operations produces a defined value, but if it
is invalid, then reading or writing a field yields an undefined result. In practice, programs
that manipulate invalid headers can exhibit a variety of faults including dropping the packet
when it should be forwarded, or even leaking information from one packet to the next. In
addition, such programs are also not portable, since their behavior can vary when executed
on different targets.
The choice to model the semantics of header types in an unsafe way was intended to make
the language easier to implement on high-speed routers, which often have limited amounts of
memory. A typical P4 program might specify behavior for several dozen different protocols,
but any particular packet is likely to contain only a small handful of headers. It follows
that if the compiler only needs to represent the valid headers at run-time, then memory
requirements can be reduced. However, while it may have benefits for language implementers,
the design is a disaster for programmers—it repeats Hoare’s “mistake,” and bakes an unsafe
feature deep into the design of a language that has the potential to become the de-facto
standard in a multi-billion-dollar industry.
This paper investigates the design of a domain-specific language for programmable data
planes in which all packet data is guaranteed to have a well-defined meaning and satisfy basic
safety guarantees. In particular, we present SafeP4, a language with a precise semantics
and a static type system that can be used to obtain guarantees about the validity of all
headers read or written by the program. Although the type system is mostly based on
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standard features, there are several aspects of its design that stand out. First, to facilitate
tracking dependencies between headers—e.g. if the TCP header is valid, then the IPv4 will
also be valid—SafeP4 has an expressive algebra of types that tracks validity information
at a fine level of granularity. Second, to accommodate the growing collection of extant P4
programs with only modest modifications, SafeP4 uses a path-sensitive type system that
incorporates information from conditional statements, forwarding tables, and the control
plane to precisely track validity.
To evaluate our design for SafeP4, we formalized the language and its type system in a
core calculus and proved the usual progress and preservation theorems. We also implemented
the SafeP4 type system in an OCaml prototype, P4Check, and applied it to a suite
of open-source programs found on GitHub such as switch.p4, a large P4 program that
implements the features found in modern data center switches (specifically, it includes over
four dozen different switching, routing, and tunneling protocols, as well as multicast, access
control lists, among other features). We categorize common failures and, for programs that
fail to type-check, identify the root causes and apply repairs to make them well-typed. We
find that most programs can be repaired with low effort from programmers, typically by
applying a modest number of simple repairs.
Overall, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
We propose SafeP4, a type-safe enhancement of the P4 language that eliminates all
errors related to header validity.
We formalize the syntax and semantics of SafeP4 in a core calculus and prove that the
type system is sound.
We implement our type checker in an OCaml prototype, P4Check.
We evaluate our type system empirically on over a dozen real-world P4 programs and
identify common errors and repairs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a more detailed
introduction to P4 and elaborates on the problems this work addresses. Section 3 presents
the design, operational semantics and type system of SafeP4 and reports our type safety
result. The results of evaluating SafeP4 in the wild are presented in Section 4. Section 5
surveys related work and Section 6 summaries the paper and outlines topics for future work.
2 Background and Problem Statement
This section introduces the main features of P4 and highlights the problems caused by the
unsafe semantics for header types.
2.1 P4 Language
P4 is a domain-specific language designed for processing packets—i.e., arbitrary sequences of
bits that can be divided into (i) a set of pre-determined headers that determine how the packet
will be forwarded through the network, and (ii) a payload that encodes application-level
data. P4 is designed to be protocol-independent, which means it handles both packets with
standard header formats (e.g., Ethernet, IP, TCP, etc.) as well as packets with custom
header formats defined by the programmer. Accordingly, a P4 program first parses the
headers in the input packet into a typed representation. Next, it uses a match-action pipeline
to compute a transformation on those headers—e.g., modifying fields, adding headers, or
removing them. Finally, a deparser serializes the headers back into into a packet, which can
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Parser Deparser
Match
Action
Figure 1 Abstract forwarding model.
be output to the next device. A depiction of this abstract forwarding model is shown in
Figure 1.
The match-action pipeline relies on a data structure called a match-action table, which
encodes conditional processing. More specifically, the table first looks up the values being
tested against a list of possible entries, and then executes a further snippet of code depending
on which entry (if any) matched. However, unlike standard conditionals, the entries in a
match-action table are not known at compile-time. Rather, they are inserted and removed
at run-time by the control plane, which may be logically centralized (as in a software-defined
network), or it may operate as a distributed protocol (as in a conventional network).
The rest of this section describes P4’s typed representation, how the parsers, and deparsers
convert between packets and this typed representation, and how control flows through the
match-action pipeline.
Header Types and Instances Header types specify the internal representation of packet
data within a P4 program. For example, the first few lines of the following snippet of code:
header_type ethernet_t {
fields {
dstAddr: 48;
srcAddr: 48;
etherType: 16;
}
}
header ethernet_t ethernet;
header ethernet_t inner_ethernet;
declare a type (ethernet_t) for the Ethernet header with fields dstAddr, srcAddr, and
etherType. The integer literals indicate the bit width of each field. The next two lines
declare two ethernet_t instances (ethernet and inner_ethernet) with global scope.
Parsers A P4 parser specifies the order in which headers are extracted from the input
packet using a simple abstraction based on finite state machines. Extracting into an header
instance populates its fields with the requisite bits of the input packet and marks the instance
as valid. Figure 2 depicts a visual representation of a parse graph for three common headers:
Ethernet, VLAN, and IPv4. The instance ethernet is extracted first, optionally followed by
a vlan instance, or an ipv4 instance, or both.
Tables and Actions The bulk of the processing for each packet in a P4 program is performed
using match-action tables that are populated by the control plane. A table (such as the one
in Figure 3) is defined in terms of (i) the data it reads to determine a matching entry (if
any), (ii) the actions it may execute, and (iii) an optional default_action it executes if
no matching entry is found.
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eth
vlan
ipv4
ethernet vlan ipv40x8100 0x0800
ethernet vlan0x8100 *
ethernet ipv40x0800
ethernet *
Packet Header Formats
Parse Graph
parser start {
return parse_eth;
}
parser parse_eth {
extract(ethernet);
return select(latest.etherType){
0x8100 : parse_vlan;
0x0800 : parse_ipv4;
default: ingress;
}
}
parser parse_vlan {
extract vlan {
return select(latest.etherType){
0x0800: parse_ipv4;
default: ingress;
}
}
parser parse_ipv4 {
extract(ipv4);
return ingress;
}
Figure 2 (Left) Header formats and parse graph that extracts an Ethernet header optionally
followed by VLAN and/or IPv4 headers. (Right) P4 code implementing the same parser.
table forward {
reads {
ipv4 : valid;
vlan : valid;
ipv4.dstAddr: ternary;
}
actions = {
nop;
next_hop;
remove;
}
default_action : nop();
}
Runtime Contents of forward
Pattern Action
ipv4 vlan ipv4.dstAddr Name Data
1 0 10.0.0.* next_hop s, d
0 1 * remove
Figure 3 P4 tables. forward reads the validity of the ipv4 and vlan header instances and the
dstAddr field of the ipv4 header instance, and calls one of its actions: nop, next_hop, or remove.
The behavior of a table depends on the entries installed at run-time by the control-plane.
Each table entry contains a match pattern, an action, and action data. Intuitively, the match
pattern specifies the bits that should be used to match values, the action is the name of a
pre-defined function (such as the ones in Figure 4), and the action data are the arguments to
that function. Operationally, to process a packet, a table first scans its entries to locate the
first matching entry. If such a matching entry is found, the packet is said to “hit” in the table,
and the associated action is executed. Otherwise, if no matching entry is found, the packet
is said to “miss” in the table, and the default_action (which is a no-op if unspecified) is
executed.
A table also specifies the match-kind that describes how each header field should match
with the patterns provided by the control plane. In this paper, we focus our attention on
exact, ternary, and valid matches. An exact match requires the bits in the packet be
exactly equivalent to the bits in the controller-installed pattern. A ternary match allows
wildcards in arbitrary positions, so the controller-installed pattern 0* would match bit
sequences 00 and 01. A valid match can only be applied to a header instance and simply
checks the validity bit of that instance.
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action next_hop(src , dst) {
modify_field(ethernet.srcAddr , src);
modify_field(ethernet.dstAddr , dst);
subtract_from_field(ipv4.ttl , 1);
}
action remove () {
modify_field(
ethernet.etherType ,
vlan.etherType);
remove_header(vlan);
}
Figure 4 P4 actions.
For example, in Figure 3, the forward table is shown populated with two rules. The first
rule tests whether ipv4 is valid, vlan is invalid, and the first 24 bits of ipv4.srcAddr equal
10.0.0, and then applies next_hop with arguments s and d (which stand for source and
destination addresses). The second rule checks that ipv4 is invalid, then that vlan is valid,
and skips evaluating the value of ipv4.dstAddr (since it is wildcarded), to finally apply the
remove action.
Actions are functions containing sequences of primitive commands that perform operations
such as adding and removing headers, assigning a value to a field, adding one field to another,
etc. For example, Figure 4 depicts two actions: the next_hop action updates the Ethernet
source and destination addresses with action data from the controller; and the remove action
copies EtherType field from the vlan header instance to the ethernet header instance and
invalidates the vlan header.
Control A P4 control block can use standard control-flow constructs to execute a pipeline
of match-action tables in sequence. They manage the order and conditions under which
each table is executed. The ingress control block begins to execute as soon as the parser
completes. The apply command executes a table and conditionals branch on a boolean
expression such as the validity of a header instance.
control ingress {
if(valid(ipv4) or valid(vlan)) {
apply(forward);
}
}
The above code applies the forward table if one of ipv4 or vlan is valid.
Deparser The deparser reassembles the final output packet, after all processing has been
done by serializing each valid header instance in some order. In P414, the version of P4 we
consider in this paper, the compiler automatically generates the deparser from the parser—i.e.,
for our example program, the deparser produces a packet with Ethernet, VLAN (if valid),
and IPv4 (if valid), in that order.
2.2 Common Bugs in P4 Programs
Having introduced the basic features of P4, we now present five categories of bugs found
in open-source programs that arise due to reading and writing invalid headers—the main
problem that SafeP4 addresses. There is one category for each of the following syntactic
constructs: (1) parsers, (2) controls, (3) table reads, (4) table actions, and (5) default actions.
To identify the bugs we surveyed a benchmark suite of 15 research and industrial P4
programs that are publicly available on GitHub and compile to the BMv2 [25] backend.
Later, in Section 4, we will report the number of occurrences of each of these categories in
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/* UNSAFE */
parser_exception unsupported {
parser_drop;
}
parser parse_ethernet {
extract(ethernet);
return select(ethernet.etherType)
{
0x0800 : parse_ipv4;
default : ingress;
}
}
parser parse_ipv4 {
extract(ipv4);
return select(ipv4.protocol) {
6 : parse_tcp;
default : ingress;
}
}
/* SAFE */
parser_exception unsupported {
parser_drop;
}
parser parse_ethernet {
extract(ethernet);
return select(ethernet.etherType)
{
0x0800 : parse_ipv4;
default :
parser_error unsupported;
}
}
parser parse_ipv4 {
extract(ipv4);
return select(ipv4.protocol) {
6 : parse_tcp;
default : parser_error
unsupported;
}
}
parser parse_tcp {
extract(tcp);
return ingress;
}
control ingress {
if(tcp.syn == 1 and ...) {...}
}
Figure 5 Left: unsafe code in NetHCF; Right: our type-safe fix; Bottom: common code.
our benchmark suite detected by our approach.1
2.2.1 Parser Bugs
The first class of errors is due to the parser being too conservative about dropping malformed
packets, which increases the set of headers that may be invalid in the control pipeline.
In most programs, the parser chooses which headers to extract based on the fields of
previously-extracted headers using P4’s version of a switch statement, select. Programmers
often fail to handle packets fall through to the default case of these select statements.
An example from the NetHCF [34, 2] codebase illustrates this bug. NetHCF is a
research tool designed to combat TCP spoofing. As shown in Figure 5, the parser handles TCP
packets in parse_ipv4 and redirects all other packets to the ingress control. Unfortunately,
the ingress control (bottom right) does not check whether tcp is valid before accessing
tcp.syn to check whether it is equal to 1. This is unsafe since tcp is not guaranteed to be
valid even though it is required to be valid in the ingress control.
To fix this bug, we can define a parser exception, unsupported, with an handler that
drops packets, thereby protecting the ingress from having to handle unexpected packets.
Note however, that this fix might not be the best solution, since it alters the original behavior
of the program. However, without knowing the programmer’s intention, it is generally not
possible to automatically repair a program with undefined behavior.
1 We focus on P414 programs in this paper, but the issues we address also persist in the latest version of
the language, P416. We did not consider P416 in this paper due to the smaller number of programs
currently available.
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/* UNSAFE */
control ingress {
process_cache ();
process_value ();
apply(ipv4_route);
}
/* SAFE */
control ingress {
if(valid(nc_hdr)) {
process_cache ();
process_value ();
}
apply(ipv4_route);
}
control process_cache {
apply(check_cache_exist);
...
}
table check_cache_exist {
reads { nc_hdr.key }
actions { ... }
}
Figure 6 Left: unsafe code in NetCache; Right: our type-safe fix; Bottom: Common code
2.2.2 Control Bugs
Another common bug occurs when a table is executed in a context in which the instances
referenced by that table are not guaranteed to be valid. This bug can be seen in the open-
source code for NetCache [13, 15], a system that uses P4 to implement a load-balancing
cache. The parser for NetCache reserves a specific port (8888) to handle its special-purpose
traffic, a condition that is built into the parser, which extracts nc_hdr (i.e., the NetCache-
specific header) only when UDP traffic arrives from port 8888. Otherwise, it performs
standard L2 and L3 routing. Unfortunately, the ingress control node (Figure 6) tries to
access nc_hdr before checking that it is valid. Specifically, the reads declaration for the
check_cache_exists table, which is executed first in the ingress pipeline, presupposes that
nc_hdr is valid. The invocation of the process_value table (not shown) contains another
instance of the same bug.
To fix these bugs, we can wrap the calls to process_cache and process_value in an
conditional that checks the validity of the header nc_hdr. This ensures that nc_hdr is valid
when process_cache refers to it.
2.2.3 Table Reads Bugs
A similar bug arises in programs that contain tables that first match on the validity of certain
header instances before matching on the fields of those instances. The advantage of this
approach is that multiple types of packets can be processed in a single table, which saves
memory. However, if implemented incorrectly, this programming pattern can lead to a bug,
in which the reads declaration matches on bits from a header that may not be valid!
The switch.p4 program exhibits an exemplar of this bug; it is a “realistic production
switch” developed by Barefoot Networks, meant to be used “as-is, or as a starting point for
more advanced switches” [18].
An archetypal example of table reads bugs is the port_vlan_mapping table of switch.p4
(Figure 7). This table is invoked in a context where it is not known which of the VLAN tags
is valid, despite containing references to both vlan_tag_[0] and vlan_tag_[1] in the reads
declaration. Adroitly, the programmer has guarded the references to vlan_tag_[i].vid
with keys that test the validity of vlan_tag_[i], for i = 1, 2. Unfortunately, as written,
it is impossible for the control plane to install a rule that will always avoid reading the
value of an invalid header. The first match will check whether the vlan_tag_[0] instance
is invalid, which is safe. However, the very next match will try to read the value of the
vlan_tag_[0].vid field, even when the instance is invalid! This attempt to access an invalid
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/* UNSAFE */
table port_vlan_mapping {
reads {
vlan_tag_ [0] : valid;
vlan_tag_ [0]. vid : exact;
vlan_tag_ [1] : valid;
vlan_tag_ [1]. vid : exact;
} ...
}
/* SAFE */
table port_vlan_mapping {
reads {
vlan_tag_ [0] : valid;
vlan_tag_ [0]. vid : ternary;
vlan_tag_ [1] : valid;
vlan_tag_ [1]. vid : ternary;
} ...
}
Figure 7 Left: a table in switch.p4 with unprotected conditional reads; Right: our type-safe fix.
header results in undefined behavior, and is therefore a bug.
It is worthy to note that this code is not actually buggy on some targets—in particular, on
targets where invalid headers are initialized with 0. However, 0-initialization is not prescribed
by the language specification, and therefore this code is not portable across other targets.
The naive solution to fix this bug is to refactor the table into four different tables (one
for each combination of validity bits) and then check the validity of each header before the
tables are invoked. While this fix is perfectly safe, it can result in a combinatorial blowup in
the number of tables, which is clearly undesirable both for efficiency reasons and because it
requires modifying the control plane.
Fortunately, rather than factoring the table into four tables, we can replace the exact
match-kinds with ternary match-kinds, which permit matching with wildcards. In particular,
the control plane can install rules that match invalid instances using an all-wildcard patterns,
which is safe.
In order for this solution to typecheck, we need to assume that the control plane is
well-behaved—i.e. that it will install wildcards for the ternary matches whenever the
header is invalid. In our implementation, we print a warning whenever we make this kind of
assumption so that the programmer can confirm that the control plane is well-behaved.
2.2.4 Table Action Bugs
Another prevalent bug, in our experience, arises when distinct actions in a table require
different (and possible mutually exclusive) headers to be valid. This can lead to two problems:
(i) the control plane can populate the table with unsafe match-action rules, and (ii) there
may be no validity checks that we can add to the control to make all of the actions typecheck.
The fabric_ingress_dst_lkp table (Figure 8) in switch.p4 provides an example of this
misbehavior. The fabric_ingress_dst_lkp table reads the value of fabric_hdr.dstDevice
and then invokes one of several actions: term_cpu_packet, term_fabric_unicast_packet,
or term_fabric_multicast_packet. Respectively, these actions require the fabric_hdr_cpu,
fabric_hdr_unicast, and fabric_hdr_multicast (respectively) headers to be valid. Un-
fortunately the validity of these headers is mutually exclusive.2
Since fabric_hdr_cpu, fabric_hdr_unicast, and fabric_hdr_multicast are mutually
exclusive, there is no single context that makes this table safe. The only facility the table
provides to determine which action should be called is fabric_hdr.dstDevice. However,
the P4 program doesn’t establish a relationship between the value of fabric_hdr.dstDevice
and the validity of any of these three header instances. So, the behavior of this table is only
2 There are other actions in the real fabric_ingress_dst_lkp, but these three actions demonstrate the
core of the problem.
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/* UNSAFE */
table fabric_ingress_dst_lkp {
reads {
fabric_hdr.dstDevice : exact;
}
actions {
term_cpu_packet;
term_fabric_unicast_packet;
term_fabric_multicast_packet;
}
}
/* SAFE */
table fabric_ingress_dst_lkp {
reads {
fabric_hdr.dstDevice : exact;
fabric_hdr_cpu : valid;
fabric_hdr_unicast: valid;
fabric_hdr_multicast: valid;
}
actions {
term_cpu_packet;
term_fabric_unicast_packet;
term_fabric_multicast_packet;
}
}
Figure 8 Left: unsafe code in switch.p4; Right: our type-safe fix.
well-defined when the input packets are well-formed, an unreasonable expectation for real
switches, which may receive any sequence of bits “on the wire.”
We fix this bug by including validity matches in the reads declaration, as shown in
Figure 8. As in Section 2.2.3, this solution avoids combinatorial blowup and extensive control
plane refactoring.
In order to type-check this solution, we need to make an assumption about the way the
control plane will populate the table. Concretely, if an action a only typechecks if a header h
is valid, and h is not necessarily valid when the table is applied, we assume that the control
plane will only call a if h is matched as valid. For example, fabric_hdr_cpu is not known to
be valid when (the fixed version of) fabric_ingress_dst_lkp is applied, so we assume that
the control plane will only call action term_cpu_packet when fabric_hdr_cpu is matched
as valid. Again, our implementation prints these assumptions as warnings to the programmer,
so they can confirm that the control plane will satisfy these assumptions.
2.2.5 Default Action Bugs
Finally, the default action bugs occur when the programmer incorrectly assumes that a
table performs some action when a packet misses. The NetCache program (described in
Section 2.2.2) exhibits an example of this bug, too. The bug is shown in Figure 9, where the
table add_value_header_1 is expected to make the nc_value_1 header valid, which is done
in the add_value_header_1_act action. The control plane may refuse to add any rules to
the table, which would cause all packets to miss, meaning that the add_value_header_1_act
action would never be called and nc_value_1 may not be valid. To fix this error, we simply
set the default action for the table to add_value_header_1_act, which will force the table
to remove the header no matter what rules the controller installs.
/* UNSAFE */
table add_value_header_1 {
actions {
add_value_header_1_act;
}
}
/* SAFE */
table add_value_header_1 {
actions {
add_value_header_1_act;
}
default_action :
add_value_header_1_act ();
}
Figure 9 Left: unsafe code in NetCache; Right: our type-safe fix.
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if(ethernet.etherType == 0x0800) {
apply(ipv4_table);
} else if(ethernet.etherType == 0x086DD) {
apply(ipv6_table);
}
if(valid(ipv4)) {
apply(ipv4_table);
} else if(valid(ipv6)) {
apply(ipv6_table);
}
Figure 10 Left: data-dependent header validation; Right: syntactic header validation.
2.3 A Typing Discipline to Eliminate Invalid References
In this paper, we propose a type system to increase the safety of P4 programs by detecting
and preventing the classes of bugs defined in Section 2.2. These classes of bugs all manifest
when a program attempts to access an invalid header—differentiating themselves only in
their syntactic provenance. The type system that we present in the next section uses a
path-sensitive analysis, coupled with occurrence typing [32], to keep track of which headers
are guaranteed to be available at any program point—rejecting programs that reference
headers that might be uninitialized—thus, preventing all references to invalid headers.
Of course, in general, the problem of deciding header-validity can depend on arbitrary
data, so a simple type system cannot hope to fully determine all scenarios when an instance
will be valid. Indeed, programmers often use a variety of data-dependent checks to ensure
safety. For instance, the control snippet shown on the left-hand side of Figure 10 will not
produce undefined behavior, given a parser that chooses between parsing an ipv4 header
when ethernet.etherType is 0x0800, an ipv6 header when ethernet.etherType is 0x86DD,
and throws a parser error otherwise.
While this code is safe in this very specific context, it quickly becomes unsafe when ported
to other contexts. For example in switch.p4, which performs tunneling, the egress control
node copies the inner_ethernet header into the ethernet; however the inner_ethernet
header may not be valid at the program point where the copy is performed. This behavior is
left undefined [7], a target is free to read arbitrary bits, in which case it could decide to call
the ipv4_table despite ipv4 being invalid.
To improve the maintainability and portability of the code, we can replace the data-
dependent checks with validity checks, as illustrated by the control snippet shown on the
right-hand side of Figure 10. The validity checks assert precisely the preconditions for calling
each table, so that no matter what context this code snippet is called in, it is impossible for
the ipv4_table to be called when the ipv4 header is invalid.
In the next section, we develop a core calculus for SafeP4 with a type system that
eliminates references to invalid headers, encouraging programers to replace data-dependent
checks with header-validity checks.
3 SafeP4
This section discusses our design goals for SafeP4 and the choices we made to accommodate
them, and formalizes the language’s syntax, small-step semantics, and type system.
3.1 Design
Our primary design goal for SafeP4 is to develop a core calculus that models the main
features of P414 and P416, while guaranteeing that all data from packet headers is manipulated
in a safe and well-defined manner. We draw inspiration from Featherweight Java [12]—i.e.,
we model the essential features of P4, but prune away unnecessary complexity. The result
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is a minimal calculus that is easy to reason about, but can still express a large number
of real-world data plane programs. For instance, P4 and SafeP4 both achieve protocol
independence by allowing the programmer to specify the types of packet headers and their
order in the bit stream. Similarly, SafeP4 mimics P4’s use of tables to interface with the
control-plane and decide which actions to execute at run-time.
So what features does SafeP4 prune away? We omit a number of constructs that are sec-
ondary to how packets are processed—e.g., field_list_calculations, parser_exceptions,
counters, meters, action profiles, etc. It would be relatively straightforward to add
these to the calculus—indeed, most are already handled in our prototype—at the cost of
making it more complicated. We also modify or distill several aspects of P4. For instance,
P4 separates the parsing phase and the control phase. Rather than unnecessarily compli-
cating the syntax of SafeP4, we allow the syntactic objects that represent parsers and
controls to be freely mixed. We make a similar simplification in actions, informally enforcing
which primitive commands can be invoked within actions (e.g., field modification, but not
conditionals).
Another challenge arises in trying to model core behaviors of both P414 and P416, in that
they each have different type systems and behaviors for evaluating expressions. Our calculus
abstracts away expression typing and syntax variants by assuming that we are given a set of
constants k that can represent values like 0 or True, or operators such as && and ?:. We
also assume that these operators are assigned appropriate (i.e., sound) types. With these
features in hand, one can instantiate our type system over arbitrary constants.
Another departure from P4 is related to the add command, which presents a complication
for our expression types. The analogous add_header action in P414 simply modifies the
validity bit, without initializing any of the fields. This means that accessing any of the
header fields before they have been manually initialized reads a non-deterministic value.
Our calculus neatly sidesteps this issue by defining the semantics of the add(h) primitive
to initialize each of the fields of h to a default value. We assume that along with our type
constants there is a function init that accepts a header type η and produces a header instance
of type η with all fields set to their default value. Note that we could have instead modified
our type system to keep track of the definedness of header fields as well as their validity.
However, for simplicity we choose to focus on header validity in this paper.
The portion of our type system that analyzes header validity, requires some way of keeping
track of which headers are valid. Naively, we can keep track of a set of which headers are
guaranteed to be valid on all program paths, and reject programs that reference headers
not in this set. However, this coarse-grained approach would lead to a large number of false
positives. For instance, the parser shown in Figure 2 parses an ethernet header and then
either boots to ingress or parses an ipv4 header and then either proceeds to the ingress
or parses an vlan header. Hence, at the ingress node, the only header that is guaranteed to
be valid is the ethernet header. However, it is certainly safe to write an ingress program
that references the vlan header after checking it was valid. To reflect this in the type system
we introduce a special construct called valid(h) c1 else c2 , which executes c1 if h is valid
and c2 otherwise. When we type check this command, following previous work on occurrence
typing [32], we check c1 with the additional fact that h is valid, and we check c2 with the
additional fact that h is not valid.
Even with this enhancement, this type system would still be overly restrictive. To see
why, let us augment the parser from Figure 2 with the ability to parse TCP and UDP
packets: after parsing the ipv4 header, the parser can optionally extract the vlan, tcp,
or udp header and then boot control flow to ingress. Now suppose that we have a table
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tcp_table that refers to both ipv4 and tcp in its reads declaration, and that tcp_table
is (unsafely) applied immediately in the ingress. Because the validity of tcp implies the
validity of ipv4, it should be safe to check the validity of tcp and then apply tcp_table.
However, using the representation of valid headers as a set, we would need to ascertain the
validity of ipv4 and of tcp.
To solve this problem, we enrich our type representation to keep track of dependencies
between headers. More specifically, rather than representing all headers guaranteed to be
valid in a set, we use a finer-grained representation—a set of sets of headers that might be
valid at the current program point. For a given header reference to be safe, it must to be
a member of all possible sets of headers—i.e., it must be valid on all paths through the
program that reach the reference.
Overall, the combination of an expressive language of types and a simple version of
occurrence typing allows us to capture dependencies between headers and perform useful
static analysis of the dynamic property of header validity.
The final challenge with formally modelling P4 lies in its interface with the control-plane,
which populates the tables and provides arguments to the actions. While the control-plane’s
only methodology for managing switch behavior is to populate the match-action tables with
forwarding entries, it is perfectly capable of producing undefined behavior. However, if we
assume that the controller is well-intentioned, we can prove the safety of more programs.
In our formalization, to streamline the presentation, we model the control plane as a
function CA(t,H) = (ai, v¯) that takes in a table t and the current headers H and produces
the action to call ai and the (possibly empty) action data arguments v¯. We also use a function
CV(t) = S¯ that analyzes a table t and produces a list of sets of valid headers S¯, one set for
each action, that can be safely assumed valid when the entries are populated by the control
plane. From the table declaration and the header instances that can be assumed valid, based
on the match-kinds, we can derive a list of match key expressions e¯ that must be evaluated
when the table is invoked. Together, these functions model the run-time interface between
the switch and the controller. In order to prove progress and preservation, we assume that
CV and CA satisfy three simple correctness properties: (1) the control plane can safely install
table entries that never read invalid headers, (2) the action data provided by the control
plane has the types expected by the action, and (3) the control plane will only assume valid
headers for an action that are valid for a given packet. See Appendix C.1 for details.
3.2 Syntax
The syntax of SafeP4 is shown in Figure 11. To lighten the notation, we write x¯ as
shorthand for a (possibly empty) sequence x1, ..., xn.
A SafeP4 program consists of a sequence of declarations d¯ and a command c. The set
of declarations includes header types, header instances, and tables. Header type declarations
describe the format of individual headers and are defined in terms of a name and a sequence
of field declarations. The notation “f : τ” indicates that field f has type τ . We let η range
over header types. A header instance declaration assigns a name h to a header type η. The
map HT encodes the (global) mapping between header instances and header types. Table
declarations t(h, (e,m), a), are defined in terms of a sequence of valid-match header instances
h, a sequence of match-key expressions (e,m) read in the table, where e is an expression
and m is the match-kind used to match this expression, and a sequence of actions a¯. The
notation t.valids denotes the valid-match instances, t.reads denotes the expressions, and
t.actions denotes the actions.
Actions are written as (uncurried) λ-abstractions. An action λx¯. c declares a (possibly
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Commands
c ::=
| extract(h) extraction
| emit(h) deparsing
| c1 ; c2 sequence∗
| if (e) c1 else c2 conditional
| valid(h) c1 else c2 validity
| t.apply() application
| skip skip
| add(h) addition∗
| remove(h) removal∗
| h.f = e modification∗
Actions
a ::= λx¯.c action
Expressions
e ::=
| v values
| h.f header field
| x variable
| kn constant
Declarations
d ::=
| t(h, (e,m), a) table
| η {f : τ} header type
| h 7→ η instantiation
Match Kinds Constants
m ∈ {exact, ternary} k ∈ K
Program Values
P ::= (d¯, c) v ∈ V
Header Types
Θ ::=
| 0 contradiction
| 1 empty
| h instance
| Θ1 ·Θ2 concatenation
| Θ1 + Θ2 choice
Action Types Expression Types
α ::= τ¯ → Θ τ ::= Bool
| τ¯ → τ
| · · ·
Figure 11 Syntax of SafeP4
empty) sequence of parameters, drawn from a fresh set of names, which are in scope for the
command c. The run-time arguments for actions (action data) are provided by the control
plane. Note that we artificially restrict the commands that can be called in the body of the
action to addition, removal, modification and sequence; these actions are identified with an
asterisk in Figure 11.
The calculus provides commands for extracting (extract), creating (add), removing
(remove), and modifying (h.f = e) header instances. The emit command is used in the
deparser and serializes a header instance back into a bit sequence (emit). The if -statement
conditionally executes one of two commands based on the value of a boolean condition.
Similarly, the valid-statement branches on the validity of h. Table application commands
(t.apply()) are used to invoke a table t in the current state. The skip command is a no-op.
The only built-in expressions in SafeP4 are variables x and header fields, written h.f .
We let v range over values and assume a collection of n-ary constant operators kn ∈ K.
For simplicity, we assume that every header referenced in an expression has a corresponding
instance declaration. We also assume that header instance names h, header type names η,
variable names x, and table names t are drawn from disjoint sets of names h,e,v, and t
respectively and that each name is declared only once.
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JΘK ⊆ P(Header)J0K = {}J1K = {{}}JhK = {{h}}JΘ1 ·Θ2K = JΘ1K • JΘ2KJΘ1 + Θ2K = JΘ1K ∪ JΘ2K
F(h, fi) = τi Field lookup
A(a) = λx¯ : τ¯ . c Action lookup
CA(t,H) = (ai, v¯) Control-plane actions
CV(t) = S¯ Control-plane validity
H(e) = h¯ Referenced Header instances
maskable(t, e, exact) , false
maskable(t, e, ternary) , H(e) ⊆ t.valids
Figure 12 Semantics of header types (left) and auxiliary functions (right).
3.3 Type System
SafeP4 provides two main kinds of types, basic types τ and header types Θ as shown in
Figure 11. We assume that the set of basic types includes booleans (for conditionals) as well
as tuples and function types (for actions).
A header type Θ represents a set of possible co-valid header instances. The type 0 denotes
the empty set. This type arises when there are unsatisfiable assumptions about which headers
are valid. The type 1 denotes the singleton denoting the empty set of headers. It describes
the type of the initial state of the program. The type h denotes a singleton set, {{h}}—i.e.,
states where only h is valid. The type Θ1 ·Θ1 denotes the set obtained by combining headers
from Θ1 and Θ2—i.e., a product or concatenation. Finally, the type Θ1 + Θ2 denotes the
union of Θ1 or Θ2, which intuitively represents an alternative.
The semantics of header types, JΘK, is defined by the equations in Figure 12. Intuitively,
each subset represents one alternative set of headers that may be valid. For example, the
header type eth · (ipv4 + 1) denotes the set {{eth, ipv4}, {eth}}.
To formulate the typing rules for SafeP4, we also define a set of operations on header types:
Restrict, NegRestrict, Includes, Remove, and Empty. The restrict operator Restrict Θ h
recursively traverses Θ and keeps only those choices in which h is contained, mapping all
others to 0. Semantically this has the effect of throwing out the subsets of JΘK that do not
contain h. Dually NegRestrict Θ h produces only those choices/subsets where h is invalid.
Includes Θ h traverses Θ and checks that h is always valid. Semantically this says that h is
a member of every element of JΘK. Remove Θ h removes h from every path, which means,
semantically that it removes h from ever element of JΘK. Finally, Empty Θ checks whether
Θ denotes the empty set. We can lift these operators to operate on sets of headers in the
obvious way. An in-depth treatment of these operators can be found in Appendix B.
3.3.1 Typing Judgement
The typing judgement has the form Γ ` c :Θ Z⇒ Θ′, which means that in variable context Γ, if
c is executed in the header context Θ, then a header instance type Θ′ is assigned. Intuitively,
Θ encodes the sets of headers that may be valid when type checking a command. Γ is a
standard type environment which maps variables x to type τ . If there exists Θ′ such that
Γ ` c :Θ Z⇒ Θ′, we say that c is well-typed in Θ.
The typing rules rely on several auxiliary definitions shown in Figure 12. The field type
lookup function F(h, fi) returns the type assigned to a field fi in header h by looking it up
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T-Zero
Empty Θ1
Γ ` c :Θ1 Z⇒ Θ2
T-Skip
Γ ` skip :Θ Z⇒ Θ
T-Seq
Γ ` c1 :Θ Z⇒ Θ1 Γ ` c2 :Θ1 Z⇒ Θ2
Γ ` c1; c2 :Θ Z⇒ Θ2
T-If
Γ; Θ ` e : Bool
Γ ` c1 :Θ Z⇒ Θ1 Γ ` c2 :Θ Z⇒ Θ2
Γ ` if (e) c1 else c2 :Θ Z⇒ Θ1 + Θ2
T-IfValid
Γ ` c1 :Restrict Θ h Z⇒ Θ1
Γ ` c2 :NegRestrict Θ h Z⇒ Θ2
Γ ` valid(h) c1 else c2 :Θ Z⇒ Θ1 + Θ2
T-Mod
Includes Θ h
F(h, f) = τi Γ; Θ ` e : τi
Γ ` h.f = e :Θ Z⇒ Θ
T-Extr
Γ ` extract(h) :Θ Z⇒ Θ · h
T-Emit
Γ ` emit(h) :Θ Z⇒ Θ
T-Add
Γ ` add(h) :Θ Z⇒ Θ · h
T-Rem
Γ ` remove(h) :Θ Z⇒ Remove Θ h
T-Apply
CV(t) = S¯
t.actions = a¯ t.reads = r¯
e¯ = {ej | (ej ,mj) ∈ r¯ ∧ ¬maskable(t, ej ,mj)}
·; Θ ` ej : τj for ej ∈ e¯
Restrict Θ Si ` ai : τ¯i → Θ′i for ai ∈ a¯
Γ ` t.apply() :Θ Z⇒ (∑
ai∈a¯
Θ′i
)
Figure 13 Command typing rules for SafeP4
from the global header type declarations via the header instance declarations. The action
lookup function A(a) returns the action definition λx¯ : τ¯ . c for action a. Finally, the function
CA(t,H) computes the run-time actions for table t, while CV(t) computes t’s assumptions
about validity. Both of these are assumed to be instantiated by the control plane in a way
that satisfies basic correctness properties—see Appendix C.1.
The typing rules for commands are presented in Figure 13. The rule T-Zero gives
a command an arbitrary output type if the input type is empty. It is needed to prove
preservation. The rules T-Skip and T-Seq are standard. The rule T-If a path-sensitive
union type between the type computed for each branch. The rule T-IfValid is similar,
but leverages knowledge about the validity of h. So the true branch c1 is checked in the
context Restrict Θ h, and the false branch c2 is checked in the context NegRestrict Θ h.
The top-level output type is the union of the resulting output types for c1 and c2. The rule
T-Mod checks that h is guaranteed to be valid using the Includes operator, and uses the
auxiliary function F to obtain the type assigned to h.f . Note that the set of valid headers
does not change when evaluating an assignment, so the output and input types are identical.
The rules T-Extr and T-Add assign header extractions and header additions the type
Θ · h, reflecting the fact that h is valid after the command executes. Emitting packet headers
does not change the set of valid headers, which is captured by rule T-Emit. The typing
rule T-Rem uses the Remove operator to remove h from the input type Θ. Finally, the rule
T-Apply checks table applications. To understand how it works, let us first consider a
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Γ, x¯ : τ¯ ` c :Θ Z⇒ Θ′
Γ; Θ ` λ x¯ : τ¯ .c : τ¯ → Θ′ (T-Action)
Figure 14 Action typing rule for SafeP4
T-Const
typeof(k) = τ¯ → τ ′ Γ; Θ ` ei : τi
Γ; Θ ` k(e¯) : τ ′
T-Var
x : τ ∈ Γ
Γ; Θ ` x : τ
T-Field
Includes Θ h F(h, f) = τ
Γ; Θ ` h.f : τ
Figure 15 Expression typing rules for SafeP4
simpler, but less precise, typing rule:
t.reads = e¯ ·; Θ ` ei : τi for ei ∈ e¯
t.actions = a¯ ·; Θ ` ai : τ¯i → Θ′i for ai ∈ a¯
· ` t.apply() :Θ Z⇒ (∑Θ′i)
Intuitively, this rule says that to type check a table application, we check each expression it
reads and each of its actions. The final header type is the union of the types computed for
the actions. To put it another way, it models table application as a non-deterministic choice
between its actions. However, while this rule is sound, it is overly conservative. In particular,
it does not model the fact that the control plane often uses header validity bits to control
which actions are executed.
Hence, the actual typing rule, T-Apply, is parameterized on a function CV(t) that models
the choices made by the control plane, returning for each action ai, a set of headers Si
that can be assumed valid when type checking ai. From the reads declarations of the table
declaration, we can derive a subset of the expressions read by the table—e.g., excluding
expressions that can be wildcarded when certain validity bits are false. This is captured
by the function maskable(t, e,m) (defined in Figure 12) , which determines whether a reads
expression e with match-kind m in table t can be masked using a wild-card. The maskable
function is defined using H(e), which returns the set of header instances referenced by an
expression e.
In the example from Section 2.2.3, if an action aj is matched by the rule (0, ∗, 0, ∗), both
Sj and ej are empty.
The typing judgement for actions (Figure 14) is of the form Γ; Θ ` a : τ¯ → Θ, meaning
that a has type τ¯ → Θ in variable context Γ and header context Θ. Given a variable context
Γ and header type Θ, an action λx¯. c encodes a function of type τ¯ → Θ′, so long as the body
c is well-typed in the context where Γ is extended with xi : τi for every i.
The typing rules for expressions are shown in Figure 15. Constants are typechecked
according to rule T-Constant, as long as each expression that is passed as an argument to
the constant k has the type required by the typeof function. The rule T-Var is standard.
3.4 Operational Semantics
We now present the small-step operational semantics of SafeP4. We define the operational
semantics for commands in terms of four-tuples 〈I,O,H, c〉, where I is the input bit stream
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E-Extr
HT (h) = η deserializeη(I) = (v, I ′)
〈I,O,H, extract(h)〉 → 〈I ′, O,H[h 7→ v], skip〉
E-Emit
HT (h) = η serializeη(H(h)) = B¯
〈I,O,H, emit(h)〉 → 〈I,O.B¯,H, skip〉
E-EmitInvalid
h 6∈ dom(H )
〈I,O,H, emit(h)〉 → 〈I,O,H, skip〉
E-IfValidTrue
h ∈ dom(H )
〈I,O,H, valid(h) c1 else c2 〉 → 〈I,O,H, c1〉
E-IfValidFalse
h 6∈ dom(H )
〈I,O,H, valid(h) c1 else c2 〉 → 〈I,O,H, c2〉
E-Mod
H(h) = r r′ = {r with f = v}
〈I,O,H, h.f = v〉 → 〈I,O,H[h 7→ r′], skip〉
E-Apply
CA(t,H) = (ai, v¯) A(ai) = λx¯.ci
〈I,O,H, t.apply()〉 → 〈I,O,H, ci[v¯/x¯]〉
E-Add
HT (h) = η initη = v
〈I,O,H, add(h)〉 → 〈I,O,H[h 7→ v], skip〉
E-AddValid
h ∈ dom(H )
〈I,O,H, add(h)〉 → 〈I,O,H, skip〉
E-Rem
〈I,O,H, remove(h)〉 → 〈I,O,H \ h, skip〉
Figure 16 Selected rules of the operational semantics of SafeP4; the elided rules are standard
and can be found in Appendix A.
E-ConstJkK(v1, ..., vn) = v
〈H, k(v1, ..., vn)〉 → v
E-Field
H(h) = {f1 : n1, ..., fk : nk}
〈H,h.fi〉 → ni
Figure 17 Selected rules of the operational semantics for expressions.
(which is assumed to be infinite for simplicity), O is the output bit stream, H is a map that
associates each valid header instance with a records containing the values of each field, and c
is the command to be evaluated. The reduction rules are presented in Figure 16.
The command extract(h) evaluates via the rule E-Extr, which looks up the header type
in HT and then invokes corresponding deserialization function. The deserialized header
value v is added to to the map of valid header instances, H. For example, assuming the
header type η = {f : bit〈3 〉; g : bit〈2 〉; } has two fields f and g and I = 11000B where B is
the rest of the bit stream following, then deserializeη(I ) = ({f = 110 ; g = 00 ; },B).
The rule E-Emit serializes a header instance h back into a bit stream. It first looks up
the corresponding header type and header value in the header table HT and the map of valid
headers respectively. The header value is then passed to the serialization function for the
header type to produce a bit sequence that is appended to the output bit stream. Similarly,
we assume that a serialization function is defined for every header type, which takes the bit
values of the fields of a header value and concatenates them to produce a single bit sequence.
We adopt the semantics of P4 with respect to emitting invalid headers. Emitting an invalid
header instance—i.e., a header instance which has not been added or extracted—has no
effect on the output bit stream (rule E-EmitInvalid). Notice also that the header remains
unchanged in H.
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Ent-Empty
· |= 1
Ent-Inst
dom(H) = {h}
H |= h
Ent-Seq
H1 |= Θ1
H2 |= Θ2
H1 ∪H2 |= Θ1 ·Θ2
Ent-ChoiceL
H |= Θ1
H |= Θ1 + Θ2
Ent-ChoiceR
H |= Θ2
H |= Θ1 + Θ2
Figure 18 The Entailment relation between header instances and header instance types
Sequential composition reduces left to right, i.e., the left command needs to be reduced to
skip before the right command can be reduced (rule E-Seq). The evaluation of conditionals
(rules E-If, E-IfTrue, E-IfFalse) is standard. Both E-Seq, E-If, E-IfTrue and
E-IfFalse are relegated to the appendix for brevity. The rules for validity checks (E-
IfValidTrue, E-IfValidFalse) step to the true branch if h ∈ dom(H) and to the false
branch otherwise.
Table application commands are evaluated according to rule E-Tapply. We first invoke
the control plane function CA(t,H) to determine an action ai and action data v. Then we
use A to lookup the definition of ai, yielding λx¯ : τ¯ . ci and step to ci[v¯/x¯]. Note that for
simplicity, we model the evaluation of expressions read by the table using the control-plane
function CA.
The rule E-Add evaluates addition commands add(h). Similar to header extraction, the
initη() function produces a header instance v of type η with all fields set to a default value
and extends the map H with h 7→ v. Note that according to E-Add-Exist, if the header
instance is already valid, add(h) does nothing. Finally, the rule E-Rem removes the header
from the map H. Again, if a header h is already invalid, removing it has no effect.
The semantics for expressions is defined in Figure 17, using tuples 〈H, e〉, where H is the
same map used in the semantics of commands and e is the expression to evaluate. The rule
E-Field reduces header field expressions to the value stored in the heap H for the respective
field. To evaluate constants via the rule E-Const (omitting the obvious congruence rule), we
assume that there is an evaluation function for constants JkK(v¯) = v that is well-behaved—i.e.,
if typeof(k) = τ¯ → τ ′ and v : τ , then .; . ` JkK(v¯) : τ ′. We use these facts to prove progress
and preservation.
3.5 Safety of SafeP4
We prove safety in terms of progress and preservation. Both theorems make use of the
relation H |= Θ which intuitively holds if H is described by Θ. The formal definition, as
given in Figure 18, satisfies H |= Θ if and only if dom(H) ∈ JΘK.
We prove type safety via progress and preservation theorems. The respective proofs are
mostly straightforward for our system—we highlight the unusual and nontrivial cases below
an relegate the full proofs to the appendix.
I Theorem 1 (Progress). If · ` c :Θ Z⇒ Θ′ and H |= Θ, then either,
c = skip, or
∃〈I ′, O′, H ′, c′〉. 〈I,O,H, c〉 → 〈I ′, O′, H ′, c′〉.
Intuitively, progress says that a well-typed command is fully reduced or can take a step.
I Theorem 2 (Preservation). If Γ ` c : Θ1 Z⇒ Θ2 and 〈I,O,H, c〉 → 〈I ′, O′, H ′, c′〉, where
H |= Θ1, then ∃Θ′1,Θ′2. Γ ` c :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 where H ′ |= Θ′1 and Θ′2 < Θ2.
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More interestingly, preservation says that if a command c is well-typed with input type
Θ1 and output type Θ2, and c evaluates to c′ in a single step, then there exists an input
type Θ′1 and an output type Θ′2 that make c′ well-typed. To make the inductive proof
go through, we also need to prove that Θ′1 describes the same maps of header instance
H as Θ1, and Θ′2 is semantically contained in Θ2. We define syntactic containment to be
Θ1 < Θ2 , JΘ1K ⊆ JΘ2K. (These conditions are somewhat reminiscent of conditions found in
languages with subtyping.)
Proof. By induction on a derivation of Γ ` c :Θ1 Z⇒ Θ2, with a case analysis on the last rule
used. We focus on two of the most interesting cases. See Appendix C for the full proof.
Case T-IfValid: c = valid(h) c1 else c2 and Γ ` c1 :Restrict Θ1 h Z⇒ Θ12 and Γ ` c2 :
NegRestrict Θ1 h Z⇒ Θ22 and Θ2 = Θ12 + Θ22.
There are two evaluation rules that apply to c, E-IfValidTrue and E-IfValidFalse
Subcase E-IfValidTrue: c′ = c1 and h ∈ dom(H) and H ′ = H.
Let Θ′1 = Restrict Θ1 h and Θ′2 = Θ12. We have Γ ` c′ : Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 by assumption,
we have H |= Θ′1 by Lemma 17, and we have Θ′2 < Θ2 by the definition of < and the
semantics of union.
Subcase E-IfValidFalse: c′ = c2 and h 6∈ dom(H) and H ′ = H.
Symmetric to the previous case.
Case T-Apply: c = t.apply() and CV(t) = (S¯, e¯) and t.actions = a¯ and ·; Θ ` ej : τj for
ej ∈ e¯ and Restrict Θ1 Si ` ai : τ¯i → Θ′i for ai ∈ a¯ and Θ2 =
∑
(Θ′i)
Only one evaluation rule applies to c, E-Apply. It follows that CA(t,H) = (ai, v¯), and
c′ = ci[v¯/x¯] where A(ai) = λx¯. ci. By inverting T-Action, we have Γ, x¯ : τ¯i;` ci :
Restrict Θ Si Z⇒ Θ′i. By Proposition 14, we have ·; · ` v¯ : τ¯i. By the substitution lemma,
we have Γ ` ci[v¯/x¯] :Restrict Θ Si Z⇒ Θ′i. Let Θ′1 = Restrict Θ Si and Θ′2 = Θ′i. We
have shown that Γ ` c′ :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2, we have that H ′ |= Θ′1 by Proposition 15, and we have
Θ′2 < Θ2 by the definition of < and the semantics of union types. J
4 Experience (Evaluation)
We implemented our type system in a tool called P4Check that automatically checks P4
programs and reports violations of the type system presented in Figure 13. P4Check uses
the front-end of p4v [20] and handles the full P414 language.3 Our key findings, which are
reported in detail below, show (i) that our type system finds bugs “in the wild” and (ii) that
the programmer effort needed to repair programs to pass our type checker is modest.
4.1 Overview of Bugs in the Wild
We ran P4Check on 15 open source P414 programs4 of varying sizes and complexity, ranging
from 143 to 9060 lines of code. Our criteria for selecting programs was: (1) each program
had to be open source, (2) available on GitHub, and (3) compile without errors, (4) and be
written either by industrial teams developing production code or by researchers implementing
3 We also have an open-source prototype implementation for P416 that handles the most common features
of P416 (https://github.com/cornell-netlab/p4check).
4 We chose to check P414 instead of P416, since there are currently more P414 programs available on
GitHub.
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Figure 19 Proportional frequencies of each bug type per-program. The raw number of bugs for
each program and category is reported at the top of each stacked bar.
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Figure 20 Frequency of each bug across all programs. The raw number of bugs in each category
is reported to the right of the bar
standard or novel network functionality in P4—i.e., we excluded programs primarily used for
teaching. Out of the 15 subject programs only 4 passed our type checker, all of which were
simple implementations of routers or DDoS mitigation that accepted only a small number
of packet types and were relatively small (188–635 lines of code). For the remaining 11
programs (industrial and research) our checker found 418 type checking violations overall.
Frequently, multiple violations produced by P4Check have the same root cause. For
example, if a single action rewrite_ipv4 that rewrites fields srcAddr and dstAddr for an
ipv4 header is called in a context that cannot prove that ipv4 is valid, then both references
to ipv4.srcAddr and ipv4.dstAddr will be reported as violations, even though they are
due to the same control bug (Section 2.2.2)—namely that rewrite_ipv4 was not called in
a context that could prove the validity of ipv4. To address this issue, we applied another
metric to quantify the number of bugs (inspired by the method proposed by others [17]): we
equate the number of bugs in each program with the number of bug fixes required to make
the program in question pass our type checker. Using this metric, we counted 58 bugs.
We classified the bugs according to the classes described in Section 2.2. Figure 19 depicts
the per-program breakdown of the frequency of each bug class, and Figure 20 depicts the
overall frequency of each bug. Notice that even though table action bugs were the most
frequent bug (with 22 occurrences), they were only found in a single program (switch.p4).
These bugs are especially prevalent in this program because of its heavy reliance on correct
control-plane configuration. Conversely, there were 9 occurrences across 5 programs for both
parser bugs and table reads bugs.
Readers familiar with previous work on p4v [20], a recent P4 verification tool, may notice
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./h.p4 , line 350, cols 12-21: error tcp not guaranteed to be valid
./h.p4 , line 118, cols 8-16: error ipv4 not guaranteed to be valid
./h.p4 , line 101, cols 42-50: error ipv4 not guaranteed to be valid
./h.p4 , line 320, cols 8-15: error tcp not guaranteed to be valid
./h.p4 , line 362, cols 12-19: error tcp not guaranteed to be valid
./h.p4 , line 362, cols 29-36: error tcp not guaranteed to be valid
./h.p4 , line 295, cols 60-69: error tcp not guaranteed to be valid
./h.p4 , line 107, cols 8-16: error ipv4 not guaranteed to be valid
./h.p4 , line 101, cols 42-50: error ipv4 not guaranteed to be valid
./h.p4 , line 163, cols 8-16: error ipv4 not guaranteed to be valid
./h.p4 , line 101, cols 42-50: error ipv4 not guaranteed to be valid
./h.p4 , line 350, cols 12-21: error tcp not guaranteed to be valid
./h.p4 , line 320, cols 8-15: error tcp not guaranteed to be valid
./h.p4 , line 362, cols 12-19: error tcp not guaranteed to be valid
./h.p4 , line 362, cols 29-36: error tcp not guaranteed to be valid
./h.p4 , line 295, cols 60-69: error tcp not guaranteed to be valid
Figure 21 Curated output from P4Check for the parser bug in NetHCF before (above) and
after (below) modifying parse_ethernet
that we detected no default action bugs for the switch.p4 program, while p4v reported many!
The reasons for this are two-fold. First, p4v allows programmers to verify complex properties,
which means that it can express fine-grained conditions on tables and relationships between
them. In contrast, we make heuristic assumptions about P4 programs that automatically
eliminate many bugs, including some default action bugs. Second, our repairs are often
coarse-grained and may enforce a stronger guarantee on the program than may be necessary;
using first-order logic annotations, p4v programmers manually specify the weakest (and
hence more complex) assumptions.
We make no claims about the completeness of our taxonomy. For example, we found
one instance, in the HappyFlowFriends program, where the programmer had mistakenly
instantiated metadata m as a header, and consequently did not parse m (since metadata is
always valid) causing m to (ironically) always be invalid.
4.2 P4Check in Action
We reprise the canonical examples of each class of bugs from Section 2.2, describing how
P4Check detects them and discussing ways to fix them.
4.2.1 Parser Bugfixes
Recall Figure 5, which exhibits the parser bug. The bug occurs because the parser, which
extracts IPv4-TCP packets, boots unexpected packets (such as IPv6 or UDP packets) directly
to ingress, which then assumes that both the ipv4 and tcp headers are valid, even though
the parser does not guarantee this fact.
In terms of our type system, the parser produces packets of type ethernet · (1 + ipv4 ·
(1 + tcp)); however the control only handles packets of type ethernet · ipv4 · tcp. Hence,
when typecheck this example, P4Check reports every reference to tcp and ipv4 in the
whole program as a violation of the type system. As shown in the top half of Figure 21, we
get an error message at every reference to ipv4 or tcp. The ubiquity of the reports intimates
a mismatch between the parsing and the control types, which gives the programer a hint as
how to fix the problem.
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port.p4 , line 248, cols 8-24: warning: assuming either vlan_tag_ [0]
matched as valid or vlan_tag_ [0]. vid wildcarded
port.p4 , line 250, cols 8-24: warning: assuming either vlan_tag_ [1]
matched as valid or vlan_tag_ [1]. vid wildcarded
fabric.p4 line 42, cols 41-67: warning: assuming fabric_header_cpu
matched as valid for rules with action terminate_cpu_packet
fabric.p4 , line 57, cols 17-54: warning: assuming fabric_header_unicast
matched as valid for rules with action
terminate_fabric_unicast_packet
fabric.p4 , line 81, cols 17-56: warning: assuming
fabric_header_multicast matched as valid for rules with action
terminate_fabric_multicast_packet
Figure 22 Warnings printed after fixing switch.p4’s reads bug (top), and its actions bug (bottom)
When we modify the default clause in parse_ethernet, as in Figure 5, and run our
tool again, all of the ipv4 violations are removed from the output, as shown in the bottom
half of Figure 21. Then fixing the parse_ipv4 parser, as in Figure 5, causes our tool to
output no violations. In particular, the type upon entering the ingress control function is
ethernet · ipv4 · tcp, so all subsequent references to ipv4 and tcp are safe.
4.2.2 Control Bugfixes
Recall that a control bug occurs when the incoming type presents a choice between two
instances that are not handled by subsequent code. The program shown in Figure 6 uses a
parser that produces the type Θ = ethernet·(1+ipv4·(1+udp·(1+nc_hdr·τ)+tcp)), where
τ is a type for caching operations. Note that Includes Θ nc_hdr does not hold. However,
process_cache and process_value only type check in contexts where Includes Θ nc_hdr
is true. P4Check reports type violations at every reference to nc_hdr. Fixing this error is
simply a matter of wrapping the process_cache() call in a validity check as demonstrated
in Figure 6. As NetCache handles TCP and UDP packets as well as its special-purpose
packets, we simply apply the IPv4 routing table if the validity check for nc_hdr fails.5
4.2.3 Table Reads Bugfixes
Table reads errors, as shown in Figure 7, occur when a header h is included in the reads
declaration of a table t with match kind k, and h is not guaranteed to be valid at the call
site of t, and if h 6∈ valid_reads(t) or the match-kind of k 6= ternary.
In the case of the port_vlan_mapping table in Figure 7, there is a valid bit for both
vlan_tag_[0] and vlan_tag_[1], both of which are followed by exact matches. To solve
this problem, we need to use the ternary match-kind instead, which allows the use of
wildcard matching. When a field is matched with a wildcard, the table does not attempt to
compute the value of the reads expression.
This fix assumes that the controller is well behaved and fills the vlan_tag_[0].vid with
a wildcard whenever vlan_tag_[0] is matched as invalid (and similarly for vlan_tag_[1]).
This also what the SafeP4 type system does, with its maskable checks in the T-Apply
5 Astute readers may detect a parser bug in this example. Hint, the ipv4_route table requires
Includes Θ ipv4 where Θ is type where it is applied.
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rule P4Check prints warnings describing these assumptions to the programmer (top of
Figure 22), giving them properties against which to check their control plane implementation.
4.2.4 Table Action Bugfixes
Table actions bugs occur when at least one action cannot be safely executed in all scenarios.
For example, the table fabric_ingress_dst_lkp shown in Figure 8 has a table action
bug, which can be fixed by modifying the table’s reads declaration. Recall that the
parser will parse exactly one of the headers fabric_hdr_cpu, fabric_hdr_unicast and
fabric_hdr_multicast, which means that when the table is applied at type Θ, exactly one
of Includes Θ fabric_hdr_i for i ∈ {cpu, unicast, multicast} will hold. Now, the action
term_cpu_packet typechecks only with the (nonempty) type Restrict Θ fabric_hdr_cpu,
and the actions term_fabric_i_packet only typecheck with the (nonempty) types
Restrict Θ term_fabric_i_packet for i = unicast, multicast. P4Check suggests that
this is the cause of the bug since it reports type violations for all of the references to these three
headers in the control paths following from the application of fabric_ingress_dst_lkp.
The optimal6 fix here is to augment the reads declaration to include a validity check for
each contentious header. We then assume that the controller is well-behaved enough to only
call actions when their required headers are valid, allowing us to typecheck each action in
the appropriate type restriction. P4Check alerts the programmer whenever it makes such
an assumption. We show these warnings for the fixed version of fabric_ingress_dst_lkp
below the line in Figure 22.
4.2.5 Default Action Bugfix
Default action bugs occur when a programmer creates a wrapper table for an action that
modifies the type, and forgets to force the table to call that action when the packet misses.
The add_value_header_1 table from Figure 9 wraps the action add_value_header_1_act,
which calls the single line add_header(nc_value_1).
The default action, when left unspecified, is nop, which means that if the pre-application
type was Θ, then the post-application type is Θ + Θ · nc_value_1, which does not include
nc_value_1. Hence, P4Check reports every subsequent reference (on this code path) to
nc_header_1 to be a type violation.
To fix this bug, we need to set the default action to add_value_1—this makes the
post-application type Θ · nc_value_1 + Θ · nc_value_1 = Θ · nc_value_1, which includes
nc_value_1, thus allowing the subsequent code to typecheck.
4.3 Overhead
It is important to evaluate two kinds of overhead when considering a static type system:
overhead on programmers and on the underlying implementation.
Typically, adding a static type system to a dynamic type system requires more work for
the programmer—the field of gradual typing is devoted breaking the gargantuan task into
smaller commit-sized chunks [5]. Surprisingly, in our experience, migrating real-world P4
code to pass the SafeP4 type system only required modest programmer effort.
6 Another fix would be to refactor the single into multiple tables, each guarded by a separate validity
check. However, combining this kind of logic in a single table helps conserve memory, so in striving to
change the behavior of the program as little as possible, we propose modifying the table reads.
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To qualitatively evaluate the effort required to change an unsafe program into a safe one
using our type system, we manually fixed all of the detected bugs. The programs that had
bugs required us to edit between 0.10% and 1.4% of the lines of code. The one exception
was PPPoE_using_P4, which was a 143 line program that required 6 line-edits (4%), all
of which were validity checks. Conversely, switch.p4 required 34 line edits, the greatest
observed number, but this only accounted for 0.37% of the total lines of code in the program.
Each class of bugs has a simple one-to-two line fix, as described in Section 4.2: adding
a validity check, adding a default action, or slightly modifying the parser. Each of these
changes was straightforward to identify and simple to make.
Another possible concern is that that extending tables with extra read expressions, or
adding run-time validity checks to controls, might impose a heavy cost on implementations,
especially on hardware. Although we have not yet performed an extensive study of the
impact on compiled code, based on the size and complexity of the annotations we added, we
believe the additional cost should be quite low. We were able to compile our fixed version
of the switch.p4 program to the Tofino architecture [24] with only a modest increase in
resource usage. Overall, given the large number of potential bugs located by P4Check, we
believe the assurance one gains about safety properties by using a static type system makes
the costs well worth it.
5 Related Work
Probably the most closely related work to SafeP4 is p4v [20]. Unlike SafeP4, which is
based on a static type system, p4v uses Dijkstra’s approach to program verification based
on predicate transformer semantics. To model the behavior of the control plane, p4v uses
first-order annotations. SafeP4’s typing rule for table application is inspired by this idea, but
adopts simple heuristics—e.g., we only assume that the control plane is well-behaved—rather
than requiring logical annotations.
Both p4v and P4Check can be used to verify safety properties of data planes modelled in
P4—e.g., that no read or write operations are possible on an invalid header. As it is often the
case when comparing approaches based on types to those based on program verification, p4v
can check more complex properties, including architectural invariants and program-specific
properties—e.g., that the IPv4 time-to-live field is correctly decremented on every packet.
However, in general, it requires annotating the program with formal specifications both for
the correctness property itself and to model the behavior of the control plane.
McKeown et al. developed an operational semantics for P4 [22], which is translated
to Datalog to verify safety properties and to check program equivalence. An operational
semantics for P4 was also developed in the K framework [27], yielding a symbolic model
checker and deductive verification tool [16]. Vera [30] models the semantics of P4 by
translation to SymNet [31], and develops a symbolic execution engine for verifying a variety
of properties, including header validity.
Compared to SafeP4, these approaches do not use their formalization of P4 as a
foundation for defining a type system that addresses common bugs. To the best of our
knowledge, SafeP4 is the first formal calculus for a P4-like packet processing language that
provides correct-by-construction guarantees of header safety properties.
Other languages have used type systems to rule our safety problems due to null refer-
ences. For example, NullAway [29] analyzes all Java programs annotated with @Nullable
annotations, making path-sensitive deductions about which references may be null. Similar
to the validity checks in SafeP4, NullAway analyses conditionals for null checks of the form
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var != null using data flow analysis.
Looking further afield, PacLang [9] is a concurrent packet-processing language that uses
a linear type system to allow multiple references to a given packet within a single thread.
PacLang and SafeP4 share the use of a type system for verifying safety properties but
they differ in the kind of properties they address and, hence, the kind of type system they
employ for this purpose. In addition, the primary focus in PacLang is on efficient compilation
whereas SafeP4 is concerned with ensuring safety of header data.
Domino [28] is a domain-specific language for data plane algorithms supporting packet
transactions—i.e., blocks of code that are guaranteed to be atomic and isolated from other
transactions. In Domino, the programmer defines the operations needed for each packet
without worrying about other in-flight packets. If it succeeds, the compiler guarantees
performance at the line rate supported on programmable switches. Overall, Domino focuses
on transactional guarantees and concurrency rather than header safety properties.
BPF+ [3] and eEBPF [8] are packet-processing frameworks that can be used to extend
the kernel networking stack with custom functionality. The modern eBPF framework is
based on machine-level programming model, but it uses a virtual machine and code verifier
to ensure a variety of basic safety properties. Much of the recent work on eBPF focuses on
techniques such as just-in-time compilation to achieve good performance.
SNAP [1] is a language for stateful packet processing based on P4. It offers a programming
model with global state registers that are distributed across many physical switches while
optimizing for various criteria, such as minimizing congestion. More specifically, the compiler
analyses read/write dependencies to automatically optimize the placement of state and the
routing of traffic across the underlying physical topology.
While our approach to track validity is network-specific, is similar to taint analysis [33,
10, 11], which attempts to identify secure program parts that can be safely accessed.
Of course, there is a long tradition of formal calculi that aim to capture some aspect of
computation and make it amenable for mathematical reasoning. The design of SafeP4 is
directly inspired by Featherweight Java [12], which stands out for its elegant formalization of
a real-world language in an extensible core calculus.
6 Conclusion
P4 provides a powerful programming model for network devices based on high-level and
declarative abstractions. Unfortunately, P4 lacks basic safety guarantees, which often lead
to a variety of bugs in practice. This paper proposes SafeP4, a domain-specific language
for programmable data planes that comes equipped with a formal semantics and a static
type system which ensures that every read or write to a header at run-time will be safe.
Under the hood, SafeP4 uses a rich set of types that tracks dependencies beween headers,
as well as a path-sensitive analysis and domain-specific heuristics that model common idioms
for programming control planes and minimize false positives. Our experiments using an
OCaml prototype and a suite of open-source programs found on GitHub show that most P4
applications can be made safe with minimal programming effort. We hope that our work can
help lay the foundation for future enhancements to P4 as well as the next generation of data
plane languages. In the future, we plan to explore enriching SafeP4’s type system to track
additional properties, investigate correct-by-construction techniques for writing control-plane
code, and develop a compiler for the language.
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A Additional Operational Semantics rules
This section presents additional evaluation rules.
E-Seq
〈I,O,H, skip; c2 〉 → 〈I,O,H, c2 〉
E-Seq1
〈I,O,H, c1 〉 → 〈I ′, O′, H ′, c′1 〉
〈I,O,H, c1 ; c2 〉 → 〈I ′, O′, H ′, c′1 ; c2 〉
E-If
〈H, e〉 → e′
〈I,O,H, if (e) then c1 else c2 〉 → 〈I,O,H, if (e′) then c1 else c2 〉
E-IfTrue
〈I,O,H, if (true) then c1 else c2 〉 → 〈I,O,H, c1〉
E-IfFalse
〈I,O,H, if (false) then c1 else c2 〉 → 〈I,O,H, c2〉
E-Mod1
〈H, e〉 → e′
〈I,O,H, h.f = e〉 → 〈I,O,H, h.f = e′〉
B Operations on header types
This section presents an in-depth treatment of the operations defined on header instance
types. In the following we assume that S ranges over elements of the domain P(P(H)).
Restriction The restrict operator Restrict Θ h recursively traverses Θ and keeps only
those choices in which h is contained, zeroing out the others. Semantically this has the
effect of throwing out the subsets of JΘK that do not contain h, i.e., we define restriction
semantically as S|h , {hs | hs ∈ S∧h ∈ hs}. Syntactically we define restriction by induction
on Θ as shown in Figure 23. The equivalence of the syntactic and the semantic definition is
captured by Lemma 3.
I Lemma 3. JΘK|h == JRestrict Θ hK.
Proof. By straight-forward induction on Θ. J
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Restrict 0 h , 0
Restrict 1 h , 0
Restrict g h ,
{
g if g = h
0 otherwise
Restrict (Θ1 ·Θ2) h , ((Restrict Θ1 h) ·Θ2) + (Θ1 · (Restrict Θ2 h))
Restrict (Θ1 + Θ2) h , (Restrict Θ1 h) + (Restrict Θ2 h)
Figure 23 Syntactic definition of the Restrict Θ h operator.
Negated Restriction Dually to the restrict operator, NegRestrict Θ h produces only
those choices/subsets where h is invalid. Semantically, negated restriction is defined as
S|¬h , {hs | hs ∈ S ∧ h 6∈ hs}. Syntactically we define Negated Restriction by induction on
Θ as shown in Figure 24.
NegRestrict 0 h , 0
NegRestrict 1 h , 1
NegRestrict g h ,
{
0 if g = h
g otherwise
NegRestrict (Θ1 ·Θ2) h , (NegRestrict Θ1 h) · (NegRestrict Θ2 h)
NegRestrict (Θ1 + Θ2) h , (NegRestrict Θ1 h) + (NegRestrict Θ2 h)
Figure 24 Syntactic definition of the NegRestrict Θ h operator
The equivalence of the syntactic and semantic definition is captured by Lemma 4.
I Lemma 4. JΘK|¬h == JNegRestrict Θ hK.
Proof. By straight-forward induction on Θ. J
Inclusion Includes Θ h traverses Θ and checks to make sure that h is valid in every path.
Semantically this says that h is a member of every element of JΘK, i.e., h < S , ∧(hs ∈
S ∧ h ∈ hs). Syntactically we define Inclusion by induction on Θ as shown in Figure 25.
The equivalence of the syntactic and semantic definition is captured by Lemma 5.
I Lemma 5. ∀hs ∈ S.h ∈ hs == Includes Θ h.
Proof. By straight-forward induction on Θ. J
Removal Remove Θ h removes h from every path, which means, semantically that it removes
h from every element of JΘK, i.e., S \ h , {hs | hs ∈ S ∧ hs \ {h}}. Syntactically we define
Removal by induction on Θ as shown in Figure 26.
The equivalence of the syntactic and semantic definition is captured by Lemma 6.
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Includes 0 h , false
Includes 1 h , false
Includes g h ,
{
true if g = h
false otherwise
Includes (Θ1 ·Θ2) h , (Includes Θ1 h) ∨ (Includes Θ2 h)
Includes (Θ1 + Θ2) h , (Includes Θ1 h) ∧ (Includes Θ2 h)
Figure 25 Syntactic definition of the Includes Θ h operator
Remove 0 h , 0
Remove 1 h , 1
Remove g h ,
{
1 if g = h
g otherwise
Remove (Θ1 ·Θ2) h , (Remove Θ1 h) · (Remove Θ2 h)
Remove (Θ1 + Θ2) h , (Remove Θ1 h) + (Remove Θ2 h)
Figure 26 Syntactic definition of the Remove Θ h operator
I Lemma 6. JΘK \ h == JRemove Θ hK.
Proof. By straight-forward induction on Θ. J
Emptiness Empty Θ checks if Θ is semantically empty. Syntactically we define Empty by
induction on Θ as shown in Figure 27.
Empty 0 , true
Empty 1 , false
Empty h , false
Empty (Θ1 ·Θ2) , Empty Θ1 ∧ Empty Θ2
Empty (Θ1 + Θ2) , Empty Θ1 ∧ Empty Θ2
Figure 27 Syntactic definition of the Remove Θ h operator
The equivalence of the syntactic and semantic definition is captured by Lemma 7.
I Lemma 7. JΘK == {} if and only if Empty Θ.
Proof. By straight-forward induction on Θ. J
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C Safety of SafeP4
We prove safety in terms of progress and preservation. Both theorems make use of the
relation H |= Θ as defined in Figure 18. The empty header instance map only entails the
empty header instance type 1 (Rule Ent-Empty). If a header instance h is contained in
the map of valid header instances H, H entails the header instance type h (Rule Ent-Inst).
The sequence type Θ1 ·Θ2 is entailed by the distinct union of the maps entailing Θ1 and
Θ2 respectively (Rule Ent-Seq) and the choice type Θ1 + Θ2 is entailed either by the map
entailing Θ1 or the map entailing Θ2 (Rules Ent-ChoiceL and Ent-ChoiceR).
We prove progress and preservation only for commands. For expressions we formulate these
properties as additional lemmas (Lemmas 8 and 9). The respective proofs are straightforward
for our system.
I Lemma 8 (Expression Progress). If ·; Θ ` e : τ and H |= Θ, then either e is a value or
∃e′.〈H, e〉 → e′.
I Lemma 9 (Expression Preservation). If Γ; Θ ` e : τ and H |= Θ and 〈H, e〉 → e′ then
Γ; Θ ` e′ : τ .
I Lemma 10 (Expression Substitution). If Γ, x : τ ; Θ ` e : τ ′ and ·; · ` v¯ : τ¯ then Γ; Θ `
e[v¯/x¯] : τ ′
I Lemma 11 (Entailment is Type Alternative). If H |= Θ then dom(H ) ∈ JΘK.
Proof. By straight-forward induction on Θ. J
I Lemma 12 (Included Instances in Domain). If H |= Θ and Includes Θ h, then h ∈ dom(H ).
Proof. By straight-forward induction on Θ. J
C.1 Control Plane Assumptions
The following propositions model the assumptions about the control plane functions CA and
CV that are required to prove type safety.
I Proposition 13 (Control Plane Reads). If H |= Θ and CV(t) = S¯ and e¯ = {ej | (ej ,mj) ∈
t.reads() ∧ ¬maskable(t, ej ,mj)} and Γ; Θ ` ej : τj for ej ∈ e¯ then CA(t,H) = (ai, v¯).
I Proposition 14 (Control Plane Action Data). If H |= Θ and CA(t,H) = (ai, v¯) and
A(ai) = λx¯ : τ¯ . ci then ·; · ` v¯ : τ¯
I Proposition 15 (Control Plane Assumptions). If H |= Θ and CA(t,H) = (ai, v¯) and
CV(t) = S¯ then H |= Restrict Θ Si.
C.2 Progress
I Theorem 16 (Progress). If · ` c : Θ Z⇒ Θ′ and H |= Θ, then either c = skip or
∃〈I ′, O′, H ′, c′〉. 〈I,O,H, c〉 → 〈I ′, O′, H ′, c′〉
Proof. By induction on typing derivations of · ` c :Θ Z⇒ Θ′.
Case T-Skip: c = skip
Immediate.
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Case T-Extr: c = extract(h)
Let (I ′, v) = deserializeη(I ) and O′ = O and H ′ = H[h 7→ v] and c′ = skip. The result
follows by E-Skip.
Case T-Emit: c = emit(h)
If h 6∈ dom(H), let I ′ = I and O′ = O and H ′ = H, and c′ = skip. The result follows
by E-EmitInvalid. Otherwise, h ∈ dom(H ). Let H(h) = v and B¯ = serializeη(v) and
I ′ = I and O′ = O.B¯ and H ′ = H and c′ = skip. The result follows by E-Emit.
Case T-Seq: c = c1 ; c2 and · ` c1 :Θ Z⇒ Θ1 and · ` c2 :Θ1 Z⇒ Θ2
By induction hypothesis, c1 is either skip or there is some 〈I ′, O′, H ′, c′1〉, such that
〈I,O,H, c1〉 → 〈I ′, O′, H ′, c′1〉.
If c1 = skip, let I ′ = I and O′ = O and H ′ = H and c′ = c2. The result follows by E-Seq.
Otherwise, the result follows by E-Seq1.
Case T-If: c = if (e) then c1 else c2 and ·; Θ ` e : Bool and · ` c1 : Θ Z⇒ Θ1 and
· ` c2 :Θ Z⇒ Θ2
By the progress theorem for expressions, we have that e is either true, false, or there is
some e′ such that 〈H, e〉 → e′.
Subcase e = true: Let I ′ = I and O′ = O and H ′ = H and c′ = c1. The result follows
by E-IfTrue.
Subcase e = false: Symmetric to the previous case.
Subcase 〈H, e〉 → e′: Let I ′ = I and O′ = O and H ′ = H and c′ = if (e′) c1 c2 . The
result follows by E-If.
Case T-IfValid: c = valid(h) c1 else c2
If h ∈ dom(H), let I ′ = I and O′ = O and H ′ = H and c′ = c1. The result follows by
E-IfValidTrue Otherwise, h 6∈ dom(H). Let I ′ = I and O′ = O and H ′ = H and
c′ = c2. The result follows by E-IfValidFalse
Case T-Apply: c = t.apply()
By Proposition 13, we have CA(t,H) = (ai, v¯). Let A(a) = λx¯ : τ¯ . ci. Let I ′ = I and
O′ = O and H ′ = H and c′ = ci[v¯/x¯]. The result follows by E-Apply.
Case T-Add: c = add(h)
If h ∈ dom(H), let I ′ = I and O′ = O and H ′ = H and c′ = skip. The result follows
by E-AddValid. Otherwise, h 6∈ dom(H). Let v = initη and I ′ = I and O′ = O and
H ′ = H[h 7→ v] and c′ = skip. The result follows by E-Add
Case T-Remove: c = remove(h)
Let I ′ = I and O′ = O and H ′ = H \ h and c′ = skip. The result follows by E-Remove.
Case T-Mod: c = h.f = e and Includes Θ h and F(h, f) = τi and ·; Θ ` e : τi
By the progress rule for expressions, either e is a value or there is some e′ such that
〈H, e〉 → e′.
Subcase e = v: By Lemma 12: h ∈ dom(H ). Let r = H(h) and r′ = {r with f = v}.
Also let I ′ = I and O′ = O and H ′ = H[h 7→ r′] and c′ = skip. The result follows by
E-Mod.
Subcase 〈H, e〉 → e′: Let I ′ = I and O′ = O and H ′ = H and c′ = h.f = e′. The result
follows by E-Mod1.
Case T-Zero: Empty Θ1
By Lemma 11, we have dom(H) ∈ JΘ1K. By Lemma 7, we have JΘ1K = {}, which is a
contradiction. J
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C.3 Preservation
I Lemma 17 (Restriction Entailed). If H |= Θ and h ∈ dom(H ) then H |= Restrict Θ h.
Proof. By straight-forward induction on Θ. J
I Lemma 18 (NegRestriction Entailed). If H |= Θ and h 6∈ dom(H ) then H |= NegRestrict Θ h.
Proof. By straightforward induction on Θ. J
I Lemma 19 (Substitution). If Γ, x : τ ; Θ ` c : Θ′ and ·; · ` v : τ then Γ; Θ ` c[v/x] : Θ′
Proof. By straightforward induction on the derivation Γ, x : τ ; Θ ` c : Θ′. J
I Lemma 20 (Entails Subsumption). If H |= Θ then H[h 7→ v] |= Θ · h
Proof. Immediate by definitions and Lemma 22 J
I Lemma 21 (Entails Removal). If H |= Θ then H \ h |= Remove Θ h.
Proof. By straight-forward induction on Θ. J
I Lemma 22 (Entailment Congruence). If H |= Θ and dom(H) = dom(H ′) then H ′ |= Θ.
Proof. By straight-forward induction on Θ J
We define Θ1 < Θ2 , JΘ1K ⊆ JΘ2K, i.e., for every S ∈ JΘ1K, S ∈ JΘ2K.
I Lemma 23 (Order Extend). If Θ′1 < Θ1 then Θ′1 · h < Θ1 · h.
Proof. By definitions of JK and <. J
I Lemma 24 (Order Remove). If Θ′1 < Θ1 then JRemove Θ′1 hK ⊆ JRemove Θ1 hK.
Proof. Immediate by definitions and Lemma 6. J
I Lemma 25 (Order Restrict). If Θ′1 < Θ1 then JRestrict Θ′1 hK ⊆ JRestrict Θ1 hK
Proof. Immediate by definitions and Lemma 3. J
I Lemma 26 (Order NegRestrict). If Θ′1 < Θ1 then JNegRestrict Θ′1 hK ⊆ JNegRestrict Θ1 hK
Proof. Immediate by definitions and Lemma 4. J
I Lemma 27 (Order Include). If Θ′ < Θ and Includes Θ1 h then Includes Θ′1 h.
Proof. By Lemma 5 and definitions.
J
I Lemma 28 (Order Choice). If Θ′a < Θa and Θ′b < Θb then Θ′a + Θ′b < Θa + Θb.
Proof. Immediate. J
I Lemma 29 (Action Type Bounds). If Γ; Θ1 ` a : τ¯ → Θ2 and Θ′1 < Θ1, then ∃Θ′2.Γ; Θ′1 `
a : τ¯ → Θ′2 and Θ′2 < Θ2.
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Proof. There is only one way to have concluded that Γ; Θ1 ` a : τ¯ → Θ2: via the [T-Action]
rule, which gives us two facts: we know a = λx¯ : τ¯ .c, and Γ, x¯ : τ¯ ` c :Θ1 Z⇒ Θ2.
Since this c is an action command, is only generated by the add, remove, modification
and sequence commands. So we perform a limited induction on the structure of c:
Case c = add(h). The only typing rule that applies is T-Add, so we know Θ2 = Θ1 · h.
Now let Θ′2 = Θ′1 ·h. Then T-Add shows Γ, x¯ : τ¯ ` add(h) :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′1 ·h. Then Θ′1 ·h < Θ1 ·h
follows by Lemma 23, and we are done.
Case c = remove(h). The only typing rule that could have applied is T-Remove,
so we know that Θ2 = Remove Θ1 h. Let Θ′2 = Remove Θ′1 h. Then T-Remove shows
Γ, x¯ : τ¯ ` remove(h) :Θ′1 Z⇒ Remove Θ1 h. Then Remove Θ′1 h < Remove Θ1 h by Lemma 24.
Case c = h.f = v. The only typing rule that could have applied is T-Mod, so we know
that Θ2 = Θ1, Let Θ′2 = Θ′1, which proves Θ′2 < Θ2 by assumption.
We know by our case assumtion that Γ, x¯ : τ¯ ; Θ1 ` e : F(h, f) and Includes Θ1 h. By
T-Mod, we only need to show that (1) Γ, x¯ : τ¯ ` e : F(h, f) and (2) Includes Θ′1 h. (1)
follows by Lemma 30, and (2) follows by Lemma 27.
Case c = c1; c2. The only rule that could have applied is T-Seq, so we know that
Γ, x¯ : τ¯ ` c1 :Θ1 Z⇒ Θ11, and Γ, x¯ : τ¯ ` c2 :Θ11 Z⇒ Θ2, and Θ′1 ≤ Θ1.
The inductive hypothesis on c1 gives us a Θ′11 < Θ11 such that Γ, x¯ : τ¯ ` c1 :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′11.
The inductive hypothesis on c2 gives us a Θ′2 < Θ2 such that Γ, x¯ : τ¯ ` c2 :Θ′11 Z⇒ Θ′2.
The result follows by T-Seq.
J
I Lemma 30 (Expression Type Bounds). If Γ; Θ ` e : τ and Θ′ < Θ, then Γ; Θ′ ` e : τ .
Proof. By induction on the typing derivation.
Case T-Constant We know e = k(e¯),Γ; Θ ` ei : τi for all i, typeof(k) = τ¯ → τ and
Θ′ < Θ. By induction hypothesis, Γ; Θ′ ` ei : τi for all i and we are done by T-Constant.
Case T-Var We know e = x, x : τ ∈ Γ, and Θ′ < Θ. We are done by T-Var.
Case T-Field We know e = h.f, Includes Θ h and Θ′ < Θ. By Lemma 27, we know
Includes Θ′ h and the result follows by T-Field. J
I Lemma 31 (Control Type Bounds). If Γ ` c : Θ1 Z⇒ Θ2 and Θ′1 < Θ1, then ∃Θ′2.Γ ` c :
Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 and Θ′2 < Θ2.
Proof. By induction on a derivation of Γ ` c : Θ1 Z⇒ Θ2. We refer to assumptions Γ ` c :
Θ1 Z⇒ Θ2 and Θ′1 < Θ1 as (A) and (B) respectively. Similarly, we use (1) and (2) to refer to
the proof goals ∃Θ′2.Γ ` c :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 and Θ′2 < Θ2 respectively.
Case T-Zero: By assumption, we have Empty Θ1. By Lemmas 7 and 27 we have
Empty Θ′1. Let Θ′2 = Θ2. We have Γ ` c :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ2 by T-Zero, proving (1), and Θ′2 < Θ2 by
reflexivity, proving (2).
Case T-Skip: We know c = skip and Θ2 = Θ1 and Θ′1 < Θ1. Let Θ′2 = Θ′1. Then by
assumption (B) Θ′2 = Θ′1 < Θ1 = Θ2, proving (2) and Γ ` skip :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′1 by T-Skip, proving
(1).
Case T-Emit: We know c = emit(h) and Θ2 = Θ1 and Θ′1 < Θ1. Let Θ′2 = Θ′1. Then by
assumption (B), Θ′2 = Θ′1 < Θ1 = Θ2, proving (2) and Γ ` emit(h) :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′1 by T-Emit,
proving (1).
Case T-Add: We know c = add(h) and Θ2 = Θ1 · h and Θ′1 < Θ1. (1) follows since we
can prove Γ ` add(h) :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′1 · h by T-Add. (2), i.e., Θ′1 · h < Θ1 · h, follows from Lemma
23.
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Case T-Extr: Similar to case T-Add. We know c = extract(h) and Θ2 = Θ1 · h and
Θ′1 < Θ1. Let Θ′2 = Θ′1 · h. (1) follows since we can prove Γ ` extract(h) : Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′1 · h by
T-Extract. (2) follows by Lemma 23.
Case T-Rem: We know c = remove(h) and Θ2 = Remove Θ1 h and Θ′1 < Θ1. Let
Θ′2 = Remove Θ′1 h. (1) follows by T-Rem and for (2) we have to show that Remove Θ′1 h <
Remove Θ1 h, which follows from Lemma 24.
Case T-Mod: We know c = h.f = e and Θ2 = Θ1 and Θ′1 < Θ1. Let Θ′2 = Θ′1. IfJΘ′1K = J0K then Θ1 == 0 by idempotent semiring equality and (1) follows by T-Zero.
Otherwise JΘ′1K is nonempty. To show (1) we need to show
(a) Includes Θ′1 h,
(b) F(h, f) = τ ,
(c) Γ; Θ1 ` e : τ
(b) and (c) follow from the assumption that the previous rule in the typing derivation was
T-Mod. This inversion also gives us Includes Θ1 h. To show (a) we calculate as follows.
h < JΘ1K by Lemma 5, i.e. h ∈ S for every S ∈ JΘ1K by definition. Since JΘ′1K ⊆ JΘ1K, h ∈ S
for every S ∈ JΘ′1K, by set theory. By definition we get h < JΘ′1K. By Lemma 5, we can
conclude Includes Θ′1 h.
Case T-Seq: We know c = c1 ; c2 and Γ ` c1 : Θ1 Z⇒ Θ11 and Γ ` c2 : Θ11 Z⇒ Θ2 and
Θ′1 < Θ1. By induction hypothesis, ∃Θ′11.Γ ` c1 : Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′11 and Θ′11 < Θ11. Again, by
induction hypothesis, ∃Θ′2.Γ ` c2 : Θ′11 Z⇒ Θ′2 (proving 1) and Θ′2 < Θ2 (proving 2) which
concludes the case.
Case T-IfValid: We know c = valid(h) c1 else c2 and Γ ` c1 :Restrict Θ1 h Z⇒ Θt,Γ `
c2 : NegRestrict Θ1 h Z⇒ Θf ,Θ2 = Θt + Θf , and Θ′1 < Θ1. Let Θ′2 = Restrict Θ′1 h +
NegRestrict Θ′1 h. (1) is immediate from T-IfValid. (2) follows from Lemmas 25, 26 and
28.
Case T-If: We know c = if (e) c1 else c2 ,Γ ` c1 :Θ1 Z⇒ Θ11,Γ ` c2 :Θ1 Z⇒ Θ12,Γ; Θ1 `
e : Bool and Θ′1 < Θ1. By induction hypothesis, there exists Θ′11 such that (1a) Γ ` c1 :
Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′11 and (2a) Θ′11 < Θ11. Also by induction hypothesis, there exists Θ′12 such that
(1b) Γ ` c2 :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′12 and (2b) Θ′12 < Θ12. Let Θ′2 = Θ′11 + Θ′12. (1) follows by T-If (1a),
(1b), and the fact that Γ; Θ1 ` e : Bool. (2) follows by Lemma 28, (2a), (2b).
Case T-Apply: We know c = t.apply(),Θ2 = Θ11 + Θ12 + ...+ Θ1n, t.actions = a1 + a2 +
...+an, ·; Θ1 ` ej : τj for j = 1, ...,m, CV(t) = (S1...Sn), (e1...em) = {ei|(ei,mi) ∈ t.reads()∧
¬maskable(t, ei,mi))} and RestrictΘ1Si ` ai : τ¯i → Θ1i. We want to construc Θ′2 < Θ2
such that Γ ` t.apply() :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2. By repeated application of Lemma 25, Restrict Θ′1 Si <
Restrict Θ1 Si. For every i apply Lemma 29 which gives us Γ; Restrict Θ′1 Si ` a :
τ¯ → Θ1i and Θ′1i < Θ1i. Let Θ′2 =
∑
i Θ′1i. (2) follows by T-Apply. To show (1), i.e.,
Θ′2 =
∑
i Θ′1i <
∑
i Θ1i = Θ2. We know Θ′1i < Θ1i for all i. The result follows by repeated
application of Lemma 28. J
I Theorem 32 (Preservation). If Γ ` c : Θ1 Z⇒ Θ2 and 〈I,O,H, c〉 → 〈I ′, O′, H ′, c′〉, where
H |= Θ1, then ∃Θ′1,Θ′2. Γ ` c′ :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 where H ′ |= Θ′1 and Θ′2 < Θ2.
Proof. By induction on a derivation of Γ ` c :Θ1 Z⇒ Θ2, with a case analysis on the last rule
used.
Case T-Skip: c = skip and Θ2 = Θ1
Vacuously holds as there is no c′ such that 〈I,O,H, c〉 → 〈I ′, O′, H ′, c′〉.
Case T-Extr: c = extract(h) and Θ2 = Θ1 · h
The only evaluation rule that applies to c is E-Extr, so we also have c′ = skip and
HT (h) = η and H ′ = H[h 7→ v] where deserializeη(I) = (v, I ′). Let Θ′1 = Θ′2 = Θ2. We
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have Γ ` c′ :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 by T-Skip, we have H ′ |= Θ′2 by Lemma 20, and we have Θ′2 < Θ2
by reflexivity.
Case T-Emit: c = emit(h) and Θ2 = Θ1.
There are two evaluation rules that apply to c, E-Emit and E-EmitInvalid. In either
case, c′ = skip and H ′ = H. Let Θ′1 = Θ′2 = Θ1. We have Γ ` c′ :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 by T-Skip,
we have H ′ |= Θ′1 by assumption, and we have Θ′2 < Θ2 by reflexivity.
Case T-Seq: c = c1 ; c2 and Γ ` c1 :Θ1 Z⇒ Θ12 and Γ ` c2 :Θ12 Z⇒ Θ2
There are two evaluation rules that apply to c, E-Seq1 and E-Seq.
Subcase E-Seq: c′ = c2 and H ′ = H
By inversion of Γ ` c1 : Θ1 Z⇒ Θ12 we have Θ12 = Θ1. Let Θ′1 = Θ1 and Θ′2 = Θ2.
We have Γ ` c′ :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 by assumption, we have H |= Θ′1 also by assumption, and
Θ′2 < Θ2 by reflexivity.
Subcase E-Seq1: c′ = c′1 ; c2 and 〈I,O,H, c1〉 → 〈I ′, O′, H ′, c′1〉.
By IH we have Γ ` c1 :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′12 such that H ′ |= Θ′1 and Θ′12 < Θ12. By Lemma 31
we have Γ ` c2 :Θ′12 Z⇒ Θ2 for some Θ′2 < Θ2. We have Γ ` c1; c2 :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 by T-Seq,
which finishes the case.
Case T-If: c = if (e) c1 else c2 and Γ; Θ1 ` e : Bool and Γ ` c1 : Θ1 Z⇒ Θ12 and
Γ ` c2 :Θ1 Z⇒ Θ22 and Θ2 = Θ12 + Θ22.
There are three evaluation rules that apply to c, E-If, E-IfTrue, and E-IfFalse.
Subcase E-If: c′ = if (e′) c1 else c2 and H ′ = H
Let Θ′1 = Θ1 and Θ′2 = Θ2. We have Γ ` if (e) c1 else c2 :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 by T-If, we have
H |= Θ1 by assumption, and we have Θ2 < Θ′2 by reflexivity.
Subcase E-IfTrue: c′ = c1 and H ′ = H.
Let Θ′1 = Θ1 and Θ′2 = Θ12. We have Γ ` c′ : Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 by assumption, we have
H |= Θ′1 also by assumption, and we have Θ′2 < Θ2 by the definition of < and the
semantics of types.
Subcase E-IfFalse: c′ = c2 and H ′ = H.
Symmetric to the previous case.
Case T-IfValid: c = valid(h) c1 else c2 and Γ ` c1 :Restrict Θ1 h Z⇒ Θ12 and Γ ` c2 :
NegRestrict Θ1 h Z⇒ Θ22 and Θ2 = Θ12 + Θ22.
There are two evaluation rules that apply to c, E-IfValidTrue and E-IfValidFalse
Subcase E-IfValidTrue: c′ = c1 and h ∈ dom(H) and H ′ = H.
Let Θ′1 = Restrict Θ1 h and Θ′2 = Θ12. We have Γ ` c′ : Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 by assumption,
we have H |= Θ′1 by Lemma 17, and we have Θ′2 < Θ2 by the definition of < and
semantics of types.
Subcase E-IfValidFalse: c′ = c2 and h 6∈ dom(H) and H ′ = H.
Symmetric to the previous case.
Case T-Apply: c = t.apply() and CV(t) = S¯ and t.actions = a¯ and e¯ = {ej | (ej ,mj) ∈
t.reads() ∧ ¬maskable(t, ej ,mj)} and ·; Θ ` ei : τi for ei ∈ e¯ and Restrict Θ1 Si ` ai :
τ¯i → Θ′i for ai ∈ a and Θ2 =
∑
(Θ′i)
There is only one evaluation rule that applies to c, E-Apply. It follows that CA(t,H) =
(ai, v¯), and c′ = ci[v¯/x¯] where A(ai) = λx¯. ci. Next, inverting T-Action, we have
Γ, x¯ : τ¯i;` ci :Restrict Θ Si Z⇒ Θ′i. By Proposition 14, we have ·; · ` v¯ : τ¯i. Hence, by the
substitution lemma, we have Γ ` ci[v¯/x¯] :Restrict Θ Si Z⇒ Θ′i. Let Θ′1 = Restrict Θ Si
and Θ′2 = Θ′i. We have already shown that Γ ` c′ :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2, we have that H ′ |= Θ′1 by
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Proposition 15, and we have Θ′2 < Θ2 by the definition of < and the semantics of union
types.
Case T-Add: c = add(h) and Θ2 = Θ1 · h
There are two evaluation rules that apply to c, E-Add and E-AddValid.
Subcase E-Add: c′ = skip and HT (h) = η and initη = v and H ′ = H[h 7→ v]
Let Θ′1 = Θ′2 = Θ2. We have Γ ` c′ : Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 by T-Skip, we have H ′ |= Θ′1 by
Lemma 20, and we have Θ′2 < Θ2 by reflexivity.
Subcase E-AddValid: c′ = skip and H ′ = H
Let Θ′1 = Θ′2 = Θ2. We have Γ ` c′ : Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 by T-Skip, we have H ′ |= Θ′1 by
Lemma 22 and 20 since dom(H ′) = dom(H[h 7→ v]) for any v, and we have Θ′2 < Θ2
by reflexivity.
Case T-Rem: c = remove(h) and Θ2 = Remove Θ1 h
There is only one evaluation rule that applies to c, E-Rem, so we have c′ = skip and
H ′ = H \ h. Let Θ′1 = Θ′2 = Remove Θ h. We have Γ ` c′ :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 by T-Skip, we have
H ′ |= Θ′1 by Lemma 21, and we have Θ′2 < Θ2 by reflexivity.
Case T-Mod: c = h.f = e and Includes Θ1 h and HT (h, f) = τi and ·; Θ1 ` e : τi and
Θ2 = Θ1
There are two evaluation rules that applies to c, E-Mod1 and E-Mod.
Subcase E-Mod1: c′ = h.f = e′ and e→ e′ and H ′ = H
By preservation for expressions we have ·; Θ1 ` e′ : τi. Let Θ′1 = Θ′2 = Θ1. W We have
Γ ` c′ :Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 by T-Mod, we have H ′ |= Θ′1 by assumption, and we have Θ′2 < Θ2
by reflexivity.
Subcase E-Mod: c′ = skip and dom(H ′) = dom(H)
Let Θ′1 = Θ′2 = Θ1. We have Γ ` c′ : Θ′1 Z⇒ Θ′2 by T-Skip, we have H ′ |= Θ′1 by
Lemma 22, and we have Θ′2 < Θ2 by reflexivity.
Case T-Zero: Empty Θ1
By Lemma 11, we have dom(H) ∈ JΘ1K. By Lemma 7, we have JΘ1K = {}, which is a
contradiction. J
